We report results of experiments designed to test the predictions of the best reply process. In a Cournot oligopoly with four Þrms, the best reply process should theoretically explode if demand and cost functions are linear. We Þnd, however, no experimental evidence of such instability. Moreover, we Þnd no differences between a market which theoretically should not converge to Nash equilibrium and one which should converge because of inertia. We investigate the power of several learning dynamics to explain this unpredicted stability.
Introduction
It is well known that the adjustment process suggested by Cournot (1838) for an oligopoly, namely that each Þrm plays a best reply to the other Þrms' previous output, is not stable in the general case. Theocharis (1960) shows that in oligopolies with more than two Þrms and with linear demand and cost functions the best reply process does not converge: if there are three Þrms, Þnite oscillations around the equilibrium positions occur, and with four or more Þrms the process shows explosive ßuctuations.
Subsequently, it has been shown that this result is not robust to small changes in the assumptions. In particular, the system can become stable if adjustment to the best reply is only partial (McManus and Quandt, 1961), or if marginal cost are increasing (Fisher, 1961) .
In this experiment we test whether convergence to the equilibrium really depends on such intricate details of the model. We propose two treatments for a four-Þrm oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions which allow to test for the stability of the Cournot adjustment process. Only in treatment A is instantaneous and perfect adjustment possible. In treatment B, Þrms must stick to last period's quantity with a probability of 1/3. In Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999) we prove that such a system with inertia is stable. Thus, the predictions are clear. In the Þrst case, the process should oscillate perpetually between two extreme values. In the second case, the process should converge to equilibrium.
We Þnd, however, no noticeable difference between the two treatments. In both cases average quantities are slightly above, but still rather close to the Cournot equilibrium outputs. The modal choice of individual quantities is at the Cournot outcome in both treatments. In experimental oligopoly markets, Theocharis' instability result does not occur.
There may be several reasons for this (unpredicted) stability. One reason could be that subjects follow a process that smooths best replies, e.g. like Þctitious play. Another reason may be that subjects tend to imitate what others do. Social psychologists (e.g. Asch, 1952) have shown a long time ago that imitation is an important factor for explaining learning behavior. 1 We Þnd evidence that imitation of the average quantity of other Þrms plays an important role in our experiment. Fictitious play, on the other hand, does not explain the data particularly well. Our regression results suggest that, in the aggregate, subjects mix between playing best replies and imitating others.
These results may be compared to an interesting experiment by Cox and Walker (1998) . They also analyze convergence of play in two treatments of which only one is theoretically stable. In Cournot duopoly the best-reply dynamic is stable only if Þrm 1's reaction function is steeper than Þrm 2's in the neighborhood of the equilibrium (with Þrm 1's quantity on the horizontal axis). Cox and Walker show that there is a sharp distinction between these two cases supporting the theoretical results. Play is almost never near the theoretically unstable equilibrium but converges nicely to the theoretically stable equilibrium.
Another related paper is by Rassenti et al. (2000) who ran several Þve-Þrm oligopoly experiments. Their central issue is whether repeated play will yield convergence to the unique and theoretically unstable static noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Surprisingly, and in contrast to previous studies and our own, they observed convergence only at the aggregate level. There is no convergence at the individual level. A possible explanation for this is that Rassenti et al. introduce substantial asymmetries in cost. A further difference to our paper is that they do not have a control treatment which is theoretically stable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces the experimental design. Section 3 offers theoretical predictions, while Section 4 presents the experimental results. In Section 5 we conclude.
Experimental design
In a series of computerized 2 experiments we studied a homogeneous multiperiod Cournot market with linear demand and cost. There were four symmetric Þrms in each market. Quantities could be chosen from a Þnite grid between 0 and 100 with .01 as the smallest step. The demand side of the market was modelled with the computer buying all supplied units according to the inverse demand function
2 We are grateful to Klaus Abbink and Karim Sadrieh for providing us with their software toolbox "RatImage" (Abbink and Sadrieh, 1995) which we used for the programming of the experiments.
with Q t = P q t i denoting total quantity in period t. The cost function for each seller was simply C(q
Hence, proÞts were π
The unique Cournot Nash equilibrium of the stage game is given by
yielding a price of p N = 20.8. The collusive outcome would be at q C i = 12.375 resulting in a price of p C = 50.5.
The number of periods was 40 in all sessions and this was commonly known. Subjects possessed all essential information about the market, i.e. they were informed about the symmetric demand and cost functions in plain words. 3 Furthermore, subjects had the possibility to use a 'proÞt calculator', which served two functions. A subject could enter some arbitrary 'total quantity of other Þrms'. Then he could either enter some amount as his own quantity in which case the calculator informed him about the resulting price and his resulting personal proÞt. Or, he could press a 'Max'-button in which case he was informed about the quantity which would yield him the highest payoff given the total amount of others. Additionally, the calculator computed price and proÞt for this best response. 4 This function was designed to give the best-reply process the best chance possible. The calculator was used, on average, in two of out three periods.
After each market period subjects were informed about the total quantity the others had actually supplied, about the resulting price and their personal proÞts. Additionally, they were reminded of their own quantity. When deciding in the next period this information remained present on the screen. Results of earlier periods were, however, not available, but subjects were allowed to take notes and a few did.
There were two treatments. In treatment A subjects could adjust their quantities in every period. In treatment B we introduced some inertia: After round one, chance moves, which were independent across individuals, determined in each period whether a subject was allowed to revise his quantity decision. This was done by a 'one-armed bandit' which appeared on the screen showing three equiprobable numbers "0","1", and "2". If "0" occurred no adjustment was allowed. Hence, the probability for allowing revision was 2/3.
The experiments were conducted in April and May 1997 in the computer lab of the economics department of Humboldt University. All subjects were recruited via posters from all over the campus. Almost half of the subjects studied Þelds other than economics or business and had no training in economics at all.
In each session eight subjects participated, constituting two groups of four Þrms. Subjects were randomly allocated to computer terminals in the lab such that they could not infer with whom they would interact in a group of four. For both treatments we had six groups of subjects -making a total of 48 subjects who participated in the experiments.
Subjects were paid according to their total proÞts. ProÞts as in (3) where denominated in 'Taler', the exchange rate for German Marks (500:1) was known. Since we considered the Theocharis result as a possible outcome in treatment A, we wanted to make sure -besides the usual bankruptcy problems -that subjects would not be frustrated by low or negative payoffs. 5 So, additionally subjects earned a Þxed payoff of Taler 150 each round. The average payoff was about DM 37.84 which at the time were roughly $21. Experiments lasted 60 minutes including instruction time.
Instructions (see Appendix A) were written on paper and distributed in the beginning of each session. After the instructions were read we conducted one trial round in which the different windows of the computer screen (see Figure 1 in Appendix B) were introduced and could be practiced. When subjects were familiar with both, the rules and the handling of the computer program, we started the Þrst round.
Theoretical predictions
In this section we analyze the implications of several learning dynamicsbest reply (BR), Þctitious play (FP), imitation of average behavior (AV), and a mixed process. For each theory we analyze whether the process converges and, if so, where it converges to. Furthermore, we calculate for each process theoretical autocorrelations, which can then be compared to the empirically observed ones.
Best-reply processes
The basic best-reply process, suggested by Cournot, assumes that each Þrm plays a best reply to the other Þrms' output from last period. If all players use this rule, i.e. if for all i,
−i´, we get the following process for total quantities
Clearly, the system explodes. Due to the non-negativity constraint for quantities, individual quantities eventually oscillate between zero output and the monopoly output. Total quantities oscillate between zero and four times the monopoly output, i.e. Q t = 198.
Consider now a best reply process with inertia and let θ denote the probability that a Þrm must stick to its previous quantity. The inertia stabilizes the process. In Huck, Normann, and Oechssler (1999, Prop. 1) we show formally that the resulting Markov process converges globally to the Cournot equilibrium for any θ ∈ (0, 1). The proof is based on the theory of potential games (Monderer and Shapley, 1996) and proceeds by constructing an improvement path from any arbitrary state to the equilibrium. The equilibrium is, of course, an absorbing state with respect to best-reply dynamics.
While the process with inertia is stochastic, we can calculate an average autocorrelation coefficient by noting that (on average)
and so
Thus, there should be negative autocorrelation as long as θ < if all subjects play best replies. An alternative way of smoothing a best reply process is through Þctitious play (FP) beliefs (Robinson, 1951) . In its basic version players choose in each round a best reply against the relative frequency of the combined quantities Q τ −i of the remaining Þrms in periods τ = 1, ..., t − 1. Given the linear structure of the Cournot oligopoly, this implies that player i chooses a best reply against
−i (after choosing an arbitrary strategy in round 1). In particular, for t > 1
It is well known (see Monderer and Shapley, 1996) that Þctitious play converges to a Nash equilibrium in potential games, i.e. in our case to the unique Cournot equilibrium. With inertia parameter θ, we have for total quantities
Hence, for θ = 1/3 an autocorrelation of 
Imitation
Research in psychology and social biology shows that individuals often "learn" by imitating others especially in complex environments. In a famous experiment Asch (1952) found that people who are faced with similar decisions tend to follow the decisions of other members in their group. In our experimental setting subjects could not observe individual quantities. But they were able to observe total -and therefore average -quantities of the remaining Þrms. It seems reasonable that subjects who are uncertain about what to do and observe that the average quantity of the other Þrms deviates from their own quantity, imitate this average quantity -thinking along the line of "everyone else can't be wrong". A preference for cautious behavior and a taste for conformity could be further reasons for imitating the average. This would result in the following process:
If all subjects were to follow this rule, clearly the process is bounded above and below by the highest and lowest initial quantities. Without inertia the process would converge simply to the average of all starting values, as can be seen by solving the system of equations (10) recursively, which yields
With inertia the process depends on the realizations of the randomization device and is therefore path dependent. Nevertheless, on average quantities are given by
which yields Q t = Q t−1 independently of θ. Thus, total quantities should be constant on average and the autocorrelation coefficient should be 1.
Mixed process
In anticipation of our experimental results we derive here some properties of a mixture of best reply and "imitate the average". Apart from the fact that such a mixed process seems to suggest itself given our data, it could result because all subjects actually mix, or -more plausibly -because some subjects play best reply and others imitate (see Gale and Rosenthal, 1999 , for a justiÞcation of a similar mixed process). 6 Generally, if α denotes the weight given to best replies and 1−α the weight given to the average quantity of the other subjects, we get the following difference equation for the case without inertia
Thus total quantities follow the process
This difference equation is stable if α < With inertia the mixed process yields (on average)
Summing over i gives
Thus, for θ = 1/3 convergence is assured independently of α, and average autocorrelation is given by 1− 5 3 α. We summarize the convergence properties and theoretical autocorrelations in Table 1 . 6 They consider a population in which most people imitate the average but some experiment on a trial & error basis. Since the presence of experimenters has similar effects as that of best-reply players, it is not surprising that they Þnd convergence to the Nash equilibrium and stability in the large. However, due to the stochastic nature of experimentation some interesting instabilities arise in the small. Note: Mean35 (Mean20) is the average total quantity measured over the last 35 (20) periods and over all six groups in one treatment. Standard deviations in parentheses.
Avg σ t−t 0 denotes the average standard deviation of total quantities from round t to t 0 . Table 2 reports average total quantities for the last 35 and the last 20 periods, respectively. 7 The mean quantity in both treatments is only slightly above the Cournot-Nash quantity of 79.2. Standard non-parametric tests show that there are no signiÞcant differences between the mean quantities for treatment A and B at any reasonable signiÞcance level. Also shown are average standard deviations of total quantities over the Þrst and the second half of the experiment. 8 It can be seen that the standard deviations of total outputs are considerably smaller in the second half of the experiment. This is signiÞcant for both treatments (p = 5.8% in treatment A, p = 1.4% in treatment B (Wilcoxon test)) and indicates convergence. Clearly, there is no tendency for explosive behavior in treatment A. Some- Table 3 : Hit ratios what surprisingly, average standard deviations are even lower in treatment A, although, this difference is not signiÞcant. Finally, Table 2 also reports empirical autocorrelation coefficients which are analyzed below. 9 So far we have only considered group outcomes. Individual quantities, however, are also quite close to the Cournot Nash prediction of q N i = 19.8. Figure 2 shows the frequencies of individual quantity choices over all periods. The modal choice in both treatments is at the bracket containing the Nash outcome.
Experimental results
[place Figure 1 about here]
We can analyze individual learning behavior further using the following hit ratios. Let
, where a t−1 is the point prediction implied by playing myopic best reply (BR), Þctitious play (FP), or imitate the average (AV), respectively. Obviously, z t i = 1 follows in case of perfect adjustment, while z t i < 0 implies a severe qualitative violation. 10 Table 3 shows the relative frequency distribution of the z-values. 9 Thus, there is a distinct difference between our results and those of Cox and Walker (1998) as they Þnd a signiÞcant difference between a treatment that should theoretically converge, if best replies are used, and a treatment which should not converge. Further experiments are required to sort out this difference. Some observations are immediate from Table 3 . While in the majority of cases subjects do adjust in the direction of BR (and to some lesser extent, in the direction of AV), complete adjustments are rare. Only in about 5% of cases do subjects adjust completely to the best reply. Fictitious play, on the other hand, hardly seems to capture behavior adequately since for both treatments almost 50% of adjustments are in the wrong direction. Overshooting (z > 1.2) is also more frequent than for the other adjustment rules.
These Þndings might be compatible with a model in which subjects adjust partially in the direction of BR (see also Rassenti et al., 2000) ,
where r t−1 i denotes subject i's best reply given the other Þrms' quantities in t − 1 and γ 1 , γ 2 > 0. However, this model cannot explain the 21.5 or 26.4 % of cases in which adjustment pointed away from BR (z < 0). Therefore, we have estimated a model which allows for a combination of adjustments to BR, FP, and AV,
is the best reply against Þctitious play beliefs (given in (8)), and i t−1 i denotes the average quantity of the other Þrms' output in t − 1. Note that a subject who strictly played a myopic best reply every period would have β 1 = 1 and β k = 0, k 6 = 1. Analogously, β 3 = 1 for someone who follows Þctitious play and β 2 = 1 for someone who always imitates the average.
We have estimated (18) with weighted least squares (WLS) using t 0.2 as a weight for all observations. 11 To account for individual differences in learning behavior we added subject intercept and slope dummies. 12 Table 4 shows the results of the regression with pooled data of all subjects.
The results for both treatments are quite similar. The coefficients β 1 and β 2 are signiÞcant at the 1% level in both treatments. The coefficients for Þctitious play are not signiÞcantly different from zero in treatment A, and signiÞcant only at the 10% level in treatment B. Given the size of the coefficients it seems that subjects played a mixture of best reply and "imitate the average", which is evidence in favor of the 'mixed process' analyzed in Section 3.3. Doing simulations, we found interesting qualitative properties of the mixed process (13) and Þctitious play. Both converge very quickly to the Cournot equilibrium. Take, as an example, the values of β 1 and β 2 in treatment A, but normalized such that they add up to one: α = 0.428/(0.428 + 0.315) ≈ 0.57. For this value, the mixed process would converge to a 1% interval of the Cournot equilibrium values in only 6.5 periods on average. 13 Similarly, Þctitious play takes between 4 and 12 periods to converge to this 1% interval. On the other hand, the pure best reply process (with inertia) converges in 25.8 periods to the 1% interval on average. For a typical simulation of these processes see Figure 2 . While a pure best reply process explodes, the best reply process with inertia converges to the Nash equilibrium but convergence is slow. The Þctitious play as well as the mix of best reply and imitation converge much faster.
Finally, we can compare the theoretical autocorrelations given in Table  1 with the empirical ones shown in Table 2 . Clearly, neither a pure best reply process nor a pure imitation process comes even close to the empirical autocorrelations. 14 However, the mixed process does much better if we use for α the estimated values from Table 4 . Likewise, Þctitious play produces autocorrelations quite close to what is observed in the experiment. For large t, the theoretical autocorrelations with FP converge to 0 in treatment A and to 1/3 for treatment B.
Conclusion
In this paper, we report results of an experiment designed to test whether the best reply adjustment process causes unstable markets as predicted by Theocharis (1960) . We Þnd no sign of instability. Play converges roughly to the Cournot equilibrium prediction in both treatments, whereas a best-reply process would predict stability in treatment A and explosive ßuctuations in treatment B.
We explore several explanations for our result based on alternative learning processes. In particular, we test a basic version of Þctitious play and a process based on a mix between playing best replies and imitating the average quantity of the other Þrms. While Þctitious play captures the overall properties of our data quite well (convergence to Nash equilibrium and the autocorrelations), it does not capture the individual round by round decisions of subjects as shown by the very low hit rates and insigniÞcant coefficients in the regressions. The regression results rather support the mixed process between best reply and imitation. Of course, one should not judge such an ad hoc learning theory based on just one experiment. Further experimental research is needed to assess the explanatory power of the mixed process.
You will receive your payment discretely at the end of the experiment. We guarantee anonymity with respect to other participants and we do not record any information connecting your name with your performance.
You can operate the computer with the keyboard or the mouse. Before the experiment there is enough time to make yourself familiar with the computer in a trial round. Money in the experiment is denominated in "Taler". At the end we exchange your earnings into DM at a rate of 500 T = 1 DM. The experiment is divided into several rounds. As said we start with a trial round. The real experiment starts with round 1.
You represent a Þrm which produces and sells a certain product. Besides you there are 3 other Þrms which produce and sell the same product. Your task is to decide how much to produce of your good. The capacity of your factory allows you to produce between 0 and 100 units each round. Production cost are 1T per unit. All units (also those of the other Þrms) are sold on a market (like on a stock exchange or in an auction).
For this the following important rule holds: The price can be between 100T and 0T. The more is sold on the market in total, the lower is the price one obtains per unit. To be precise the price falls by 1T for each additional unit supplied. If -this is only an example -the other Þrms supply together 10 units and your Þrm supplies 3 units, then total quantity is 13. The resulting price is 100 − 13 = 87. If the total quantity were 90, the price would be 100 − 90 = 10. Profit per unit is the difference between the price and the cost per unit of 1T. Note that you make a loss if the price is lower than the per unit cost. Your proÞt in a given round results from multiplying the proÞt per unit with your supplied quantity.
In each round the quantities of all Þrms are recorded and the resulting proÞts are calculated. In each round you will be told your proÞt. ProÞts from all periods are added and the sum is paid out to you in cash at the end. Additionally you receive a Þxed payment of 150T each round. This will be added to your proÞt each round.
In the Þrst round you decide on a quantity you want to produce and sell. In all further rounds chance decides whether you have the opportunity to This ¶ for treatment B only. revise your quantity. The computer has a mechanism which is comparable to a "one-armed bandit": If you draw a "1" or a "2", you may change your quantity. If you draw a "0", you may not. That is, you may change your quantity in 2 out of 3 cases. With a "0" the quantity of last period is supplied automatically again. Note, that your quantity might be Þxed for several rounds. Following a "1" or a "2" you may revise your quantity.
In this case you will receive the following information. You are told the total quantity of the other Þrms last period, and last period's price.
Additionally, you have access to a proÞt calculator. The proÞt calculator is shown on the last page of the instructions. It has two functions: 1. It calculates your proÞt for arbitrary quantity combinations. That is, you can enter two values, a total quantity for the others (button "A") and a quantity for yourself (button "I"), and the machine tells you how much you would earn. 2. You can let it calculate for arbitrary quantities of others (button "A") the quantity at which you would make the highest proÞt (button "M"). You can use the machine as much as you want before each decision. Before we start you will have enough time to get to know the proÞt calculator directly at the computer.
Everything we have explained to you holds for the other Þrms as well. In fact, you are all reading exactly identical instructions.
The experiment lasts for 40 periods in total. Afterwards you will receive your payments in DM. We want to reassure you again that all data will be treated conÞdentially. (11) with α = .57. BR is the regular best reply process, and BR with inertia is the best reply process with θ = 
